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Abstract
The paper explores how to integrate a Transnational Labour Inspectorate (‘TLI’) deal-
ing with transnational private instruments of Multinational Enterprises (‘MNEs’) into 
the International Labour Organization (‘ILO’). After exploring monitoring initiatives 
with roots in public international organizations, we will argue that from an interna-
tional law perspective on international legal personality such activities can be justi-
fied. Under the qualification of ‘subject normation’, as we dub these activities, we will 
argue that the ILO is the best situated locus to embed a system to inspect commit-
ments MNEs voluntary adhere to in their CSR strategies, including Global Framework 
Agreements. Finally, we explain how the TLI as we envisage it could fit within the ex-
isting system of enforcement and compliance monitoring of the ILO.
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1 Introduction
With the increase in awareness of multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’), and 
their attention to corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’),4 the call for indepen-
dent, reliable and credible monitoring of their policies, often expressed 
through transnational private initiatives such as codes of conduct and global 
framework agreements,5 has increased as well.6 In this context we introduced 
in 2013 the idea for a transnational labour inspectorate (TLI).7 We proposed 
that this TLI should focus on the monitoring of MNEs’ CSR policies in addi-
tion to national labour inspection activities monitoring compliance with na-
tional laws. Furthermore, we suggested that such a” TLI system should be fa-
cilitated by an international organization, preferably the International Labour 
Organization (‘ILO’), in order to secure its independence and enhance its cred-
ibility. This article follows up on the 2013 paper and will argue that the momen-
tum to set up such a system is ripening, alongside perception of the legitimacy 
of an international organization undertaking this role. Accordingly, we will 
indicate how such a TLI system could fit within the ILO’s existing supervisory 
and monitoring activities.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we will elaborate on the 
need for a TLI, briefly recap our proposal for a TLI, and discuss some similar 
ideas related to the functions of the ILO. In section 3 we describe and analyse 
existing and proposed monitoring initiatives that have some resemblance to 
our TLI proposal, in particular because these initiatives include some form of 
inspection and/or have a public root via an international organization. In sec-
tion 4 we will elaborate on the question of the legitimacy of international 
4 See for more in-depth accounts of this development, eg Niklas Egels-Zandén, ‘TNC Motives 
for Signing International Framework Agreements: A Continuous Bargaining Model of Stake-
holder Pressure’ (2009) 84 Journal of Business Ethics 529; Isabelle Schömann et al, Codes of 
conduct and international framework agreements: new forms of governance at company level 
(Eurofound Report, 2008).
5 Konstantinos Papadakis, Shaping Global Industrial Relations. The Impact of International 
Framework Agreements (Palgrave McMillan, 2011).
6 See Kevin Kolben, ‘Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance’ (2011) 12(2) 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 403; André Sobczak. ‘Codes of Conduct in Subcontracting Net-
works: A Labour Law Perspective’ (2003) 44 Journal of Business Ethics 225; Lone Riisgaard, 
‘International Framework Agreements: A New Model for Securing Workers Rights?’ (2005) 
44(4) Industrial Relations 709; Guiseppe Casale, The Effectiveness of Labour Law And The Role 
of Labour Inspection (General Report XX World Congress ISL&SSL, 2012).
7 García-Muñoz Alhambra, Manuel A, Beryl ter Haar and Attila Kun, ‘Independent monitoring of 
private transnational regulation of labour standards: A feasible proposition for a “transnational 
labour inspectorate” system?´ in Edoardo Ales and Iacopo Senatori (eds), The  Transnational 
Dimension of Labour Relations: a New Order in the Making? (G Giappichelli, 2013) 254.
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 organizations to adopt rules, including monitoring systems, for MNEs, an ac-
tivity we label ‘subject normation’. This question is closely related to the 
 acceptance of international legal personality for MNEs, the exploration of 
which is therefore part of this section. Section 5 concludes with an elaboration 
on how our idea for a TLI system fits within the ILO’s supervisory and moni-
toring activities.
In this article we use the terms transnational or supranational to refer to 
those regulatory devices, institutions or enterprises that operate, or are de-
signed to operate, in more than one nation State and consequently affect more 
than one national legal order. Finally, we refrain from engaging in an analysis 
of the political feasibility of our proposal. The aim of this article lies with il-
lustrating and analysing the factual need for a TLI system and how this could 
fit within the ILO’s supervisory and monitoring activities from a legal- technical 
point of view.
2 The Need for a Publicly Rooted System to Monitor Transnational 
Private Labour Initiatives
To put our proposal in context, a few words must be said about the need for a 
publicly rooted TLI system in order to create more independent, reliable and 
credible monitoring of transnational private labour initiatives (‘TPLIs’), like 
MNEs’ Codes of Conducts and GFAs.
TPLIs have emerged since the 1990s, in order to fill a regulatory gap between 
national and international public labour law regulations. They are designed to 
regulate the behaviour of transnationally operating economic actors, especial-
ly MNEs.8 These TPLIs differ in many aspects, such as their content, the level 
of stakeholders’ involvement, etc.9 They have in common that there are ques-
tions regarding their credibility.10 Catastrophes like the collapse of the Savar 
building at the Rana Plaza in Bangladesh with more than 1100 workers dead 
and approximately 2500 workers injured,11 or persisting messages about the 
high number of deadly work accidents in Qatar in preparation for the 2022 
8 See for an account of their emergence, among others, Papadakis, above n 2, 3–7.
9 See for a comparative analysis of the form, content and involvement of stakeholders, An-
tonio García-Muñoz Alhambra, Beryl ter Haar and Attila Kun, ‘Soft on the Inside, Hard on 
the Outside: An Analysis of the Legal Nature of New Forms of International Labour Law’ 
(2011) 4(27) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 337.
10 Kolben, above n 3.
11 See in general at the website of the ILO: <https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/geip/
WCMS_614394/lang--en/index.htm>. See also: Motoko Aizawa and Salil Tripathi, ‘Beyond 
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FIFA World Cup,12 confirm scepticism about the effectiveness of TPLIs. Hence, 
in the academic literature, a lot of research has been conducted about the ef-
fectiveness of these initiatives.13 A key concern in this research is how to hold 
MNEs, especially brand companies, accountable for misconduct taking place 
in their value chain.14 The majority of this research, unfortunately, confirms 
earlier scepticism as they find that these initiatives are not very effective in 
terms of providing better protection for workers. A problem often highlighted 
with respect to the application of TPLIs is the lack of serious and effective 
monitoring systems.15
In response to the scepticism, but also learning from good practices, initia-
tives to improve the effectiveness of TPLIs are being developed. An important 
element of such initiatives is the concept of due diligence16 which requires 
MNEs to develop policies along their supply chain to improve compliance 
with human rights, including fundamental labour rights.17 More specifically, 
Rana Plaza: Next Steps for the Global Garment Industry and Bangladeshi Manufacturers’ 
(2016) 1(1) Business and Human Rights Journal 145, 145.
12 ITUC, The case against Qatar, host of the FIFA 2022 World Cup (ITUC Special Report, 2014) 
28; Jonathan Liew, ‘World Cup 2022: Qatar’s workers are not workers, they are slaves, and 
they are building mausoleums, not stadiums’, The Independent (London) October 3, 2017. 
See also: Beryl ter Haar, ‘The FIFA 2022 World Cup and labour rights - seizing the moment 
for labour law reforms in Qatar’ (2018) 5(1) Kutafin University Law Review 139.
13 See eg Richard M. Locke, The Promise and Limits of Power. Promoting Labor Standards in a 
Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 2013); Christina Niforou ‘International 
Framework Agreements and Industrial Relations Governance: Global Rhetoric versus Lo-
cal Realities’ (2012) 50(2) British Journal of Industrial Relations 359; Pamela K. Robinson, 
‘Do Voluntary Labour Initiatives Make a Difference for the Conditions of Workers in Glob-
al Supply Chains?’ (2010) 52(5) Journal of Industrial Relations 561; Dong Hoang and Bryn 
Jones, ‘Why do corporate codes of conduct fail? Women workers and clothing supply 
chains in Vietnam’ (2012) 12(1) Global Social Policy 67.
14 See eg Aukje van Hoek and Frank Hendrickx, International private law aspects of dispute 
settlement related to transnational company agreements: final report (European Commis-
sion, 2009); Nicolas Bueno, ‘Multinational Enterprises and Labor Rights: Concepts and 
Implementation’, in Janice Bellace and Beryl ter Haar (eds), Research Handbook on La-
bour, Business and Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar) (forthcoming).
15 See above, n 3.
16 A concept that is elaborately developed by the OECD: OECD, Due Diligence Guidance for 
Responsible Business Conduct (30 May 2018) <www.oecd.org/investment/due-diligence-
guidance-for-responsible-business-conduct.htm>.
17 Anne Trebilcock, ‘Due diligence on labour issues - Opportunities and limits of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ in Adelle Blackett and Anne Trebil-
cock (eds), Research Handbook on Transnational Labour Law (Edward Elgar, 2015) 93; At-
tila Kun, ‘How to Operationalize Open Norms in Hard and Soft Laws: Reflections Based on 
Two Distinct Regulatory Examples’ (2018) 1 International Journal of Comparative Labour 
Law & Industrial Relations 23.
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due diligence can be defined as “the process through which enterprises can 
 identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and 
potential adverse human rights impacts”.18 How MNEs will do this and which 
human and labour rights they will adhere to is often expressed in their TPLI, 
eg a code of conduct. As such, TPLIs can be perceived as part and parcel of a 
complex due diligence process.
TPLIs frequently contain — harder or softer — provisions on implementa-
tion throughout the value chain, including mechanisms for compliance and 
monitoring.19 Since due diligence is often phrased in risk management,20 moni-
toring is an important aspect to gain trust in terms of the credibility of a MNE’s 
CSR policy. However, there are many different forms of monitoring, varying 
from administrative audits (“ticking the boxes”) to intensive actions, including 
stakeholder consultations, workers interviews, (unannounced) plant visits, 
etc. The more intensive and stringent the form of monitoring that is applied, 
the more seriously the monitoring is taken. The more serious the monitoring 
is, the more a MNE’s CSR Policy will be respected by investors, clients and 
consumers, among others.
An important general normative expectation about the monitoring of 
 TPLIs is that — ideally — it is done as independently as possible from the 
MNE; not only formally, but also in terms of its economic influence.21 The im-
portance of independence of a monitoring entity is for example stressed in 
Article 6 of ILO Convention No 81, which deals with labour inspectorates. As 
we argued with the introduction of the TLI, such situation is in contrast with 
most of the current monitoring practices concerning TPLIs.22 Although trans-
national private monitoring cannot equal monitoring at national level, for ex-
ample because the former is based on a network / multi-stakeholder attitude 
and market-based sanctions whereas the latter takes place in a hierarchical 
18 OHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) principle 17 <https://
www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf>; OECD, 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011) ch 2, para 14 and ch 4, para 15 <https://www 
.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf>.
19 See eg Christian Welz, ‘A Qualitative Analysis of International Framework Agreements: 
Implementation and Impact’, in Konstantin Papadakis (ed), Shaping Global Industrial Re-
lations, the Impact of International Framework Agreements (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011) 
38–60.
20 See Bueno, above n 11. See also Björn Fasterling, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence as Risk 
Management: Social Risk Versus Human Rights Risk’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights 
Journal 225, 226.
21 See Sobczak, above n 3.
22 See García-Muñoz Alhambra, above n 4, 265.
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setting with the use of public, mainly negative, sanctions.23 With our TLI pro-
posal we aimed to introduce a form of monitoring as independent as possible, 
particularly via a “public root”.
In short, the TLI system we proposed includes the following basic elements.24 
The most important element is that the TLI should have a “public root”. With 
this we mean that the TLI should be embedded in a public international orga-
nization. For several reasons, which we will elaborate on in the next paragraph 
and in section 5, we consider the ILO as the international organization par 
excellence. Second, using the TLI is voluntary, which means it is a matter of 
discretionary decision by MNEs. This is due to the presumed lack of compe-
tence to make something like this mandatory.25 Thirdly, the monitoring is lim-
ited to what the MNEs are committed to in their TPLI; after all, this is what 
they want to monitor as seriously as possible. Furthermore, we proposed a 
“protocol” to ensure the independence and quality of the monitoring by the 
TLI.26 This protocol should address issues such as the selection of the TLI- 
inspector which will lead the monitoring; the powers of the TLI; the composi-
tion of the MNE’s specific TLI-committee; the monitoring procedures; the 
 access to all parts of the MNE; and the form and enclosure of the outcome of 
the monitoring (‘the TLI-report’). In addition, we considered aspects such as 
exclusion of the liability of the ILO and TLI in case a catastrophe happens 
despite the monitoring; payment of a fee by the MNE to cover the costs of the 
monitoring by the TLI; and the regularity of the monitoring.27
More particularly with respect to the role of the ILO, we envisaged the Orga-
nization to provide and maintain a list of accredited independent ‘transnation-
al labour inspectors’. These inspectors will be also trained by the ILO especially 
on issues generally found in the TPLIs of MNEs. MNEs voluntary opt for mon-
itoring by the TLI. Once the MNE has opted for monitoring by the TLI, the 
MNE can select an inspector from the ILO’s list of accredited inspectors. Led 
by the inspector, in collaboration with the MNE, the full monitoring body is 
comprised according to the rules and procedures set out in the above described 
protocol. More concretely, this means that the role of the ILO is limited to pro-
viding the list of inspectors, training the inspectors, and managing administra-
tion concerned with the participation of the MNE in the TLI-system. As such, 
23 Ibid 258.
24 Ibid 275–77.
25 We will eleborate on this in sections 4 and 5.
26 García-Muñoz Alhambra, above n 4, 277–81.
27 Ibid 277–83.
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it is a purely facilitating role based on the expertise and activities already com-
mon to the ILO.28
As indicated, we will here also elaborate on the argument to have a public 
root with the ILO. In our previous paper we draw inspiration from doctrinal 
proposals by, among others, Hepple,29 Van Opijnen and Oldenziel,30 Pires,31 
and Arrigo, Casale and Fasani.32 All of them make some link to the ILO. More 
recently, Van der Heijden and Zandvliet made an even stronger statement ar-
guing that ‘institutionally, the ILO should engage more directly with  businesses 
and use its authoritative role to strengthen supply-chain bargaining.’33 Accord-
ingly, they promote the idea of an “international factory inspectorate, which 
could play a more assertive role than current ILO missions”.34 To support their 
idea they refer to a similar, already existing inspection, namely the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, which has a mandate to carry out site visits at its 
Member States’ nuclear facilities.35 Furthermore, Van der Heijden and Zandv-
liet emphasize that, among its existing supervisory mechanisms, the ILO has 
the option to employ a Commissions of Inquiry and Direct Contact Missions to 
conduct fact-finding operations. These mechanisms have also been used in the 
28 Since it is one of the aims of this paper to stipulate this, we will elaborate more on this in 
the last section.
29 Who stressed the need to set up “an international conciliation and arbitration service to 
resolve disputes between governments, TNCs and workers involving the alleged violation 
of rights under ILO conventions, bilateral treaties, corporate codes and international col-
lective agreements.” Bob Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade, (Hart Publishing, 2005).
30 Who put forward the ambitious idea for the establishment of a specific non-judicial mon-
itoring authority at EU-level, which should be equipped with a mandate to investigate, 
sanction and provide remedies for abuses. Marjon van Opijnen and Joris Oldenziel, Re-
sponsible Supply Chain Management, Potential success factors and challenges for address-
ing prevailing human rights and other CSR issues in supply chains of EU-based companies, 
(European Union, 2011).
31 Who promotes a broad understanding of the intervention by the labour inspector creat-
ing a “social push” through legal, managerial and technological advancement (on which 
we built the TLI’s broad mandate). Roberto Pires, ‘Labour inspection and development: 
some reflections’ (Working Paper No 9, ILO, 2011).
32 Who stressed that great strength of the labour inspectorate lies in thousands of sworn in 
public servants, (on which argument we built the need for a publicly rooted form of moni-
toring of TPLR, like the TLI) Gianni Arrigo, Giuseppe Casale and Mario Fasani, ‘A Guide 
to Selected Labour Inspection Systems (with Special Reference to OSH)’ (Working Paper 
No 10, ILO, 2011).
33 Paul van der Heijden and Ruben Zandvliet, ‘Enforcement of Fundamental Labor Rights — 
The Network Approach: Closing the Governance Gaps in Low-Wage Manufacturing Indus-
tries’ (Policy Brief, The Hague Institute for Global Justice, 2014) 10.
34 Ibid.
35 Regulated in Title XII Agency Safeguards of the Statute of the IAEA.
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past, albeit as a last resort only.36 These interventions are of a more political 
character than the activities of labour inspectors. As such, an international in-
spectorate could be more proactive than the current ILO mechanisms.
Another advantage they highlight is that such an international inspectorate 
could focus “on ‘invisible’ sectors that are not on the CSR radar”.37 Van der Hei-
jden and Zandvliet conclude with the argument that such an “international 
factory inspectorate” could be an interesting “addition to the ILO toolkit rather 
than an alternative to existing public or private inspections”.38
This idea of Van der Heijden and Zandvliet and our idea for a TLI have 
strong similarities in the way that each seeks a role for the ILO. In the context 
of this paper, the idea of Van der Heijden and Zandvliet is particularly interest-
ing because of how they compare and relate this to the ILO’s supervisory 
mechanisms. However, they do not take this idea as far as indicating how it fits 
with the general role of the ILO being an international organization, nor do 
they specify how a form of a TLI can be embedded in the existing machinery 
of the ILO. The main aim of our contribution though is to do exactly that. Be-
fore we will elaborate on this (see section 5), we will explore some existing 
monitoring initiatives with public roots (section 3) and assess to what extent 
the ILO could embed a TLI for MNEs given the role and competence of inter-
national organizations (section 4).
3 Selected Examples of ‘Transnational’ Monitoring with a Public 
Root
In this section we analyse some existing forms or ideas of transnational moni-
toring of labour standards with a public root, ie a link to an international orga-
nization. These examples are very diverse (and often immature), but they have 
at least one common feature: by hook or by crook, they aim to lift up the moni-
toring function to a new transnational level with the involvement of some 
form of public authority.
36 See Commission of Inquiry for examples. One of the last CoI’s the ILO Governing Body 
has appointed deals with allegations of violations of labour standards by the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela. See <www.ilo.org>.
37 See for a similar conclusion about the focus of CSR Chikako Oka, ‘Evaluating a Promising 
Model of Non-State Labour Regulation: The Case of Cambodia’s Apparel Sector’, in Deidre 
McCann et al (eds) Creative Labour Regulation. Advances in Labour Studies (Palgrave Mac-
millan, 2014) 259.
38 Van der Heijden and Zandvliet, above n 31, 10–11.
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More specifically, the following initiatives are analysed: three initiatives by 
the European Union [the short-lived European Monitoring Platform (‘EMP’), 
the proposed and widely discussed Optional Legal Framework (‘OLF’) for 
Transnational Company Agreements (‘TCAs’), and the European Labour Au-
thority (‘ELA’ – which is still under construction)]; the debates within the UN 
Human Rights Council for a binding instrument on ‘business and human 
rights’, connected to which an independent monitoring body has also been 
contemplated; and the Bangladesh Accord, which includes factory inspections 
with some engagement of the ILO. Lastly, we will address some forms of moni-
toring by OECD NCPs.
Analysing what kind of monitoring these initiatives have set up and how 
these monitoring activities are embedded in (or involve) international organi-
zations will help us to identify the strengths and shortcomings of what already 
exists and reinforces our arguments on the need for a publicly rooted TLI. 
Moreover, it will enable us to understand how the ILO could (and should) em-
bed a TLI-system.
3.1 Monitoring initiatives by the European Union
Since the late 1990s the EU has been remarkably active in adopting policies 
addressing MNEs in the context of CSR and Human Rights.39 Three selected 
initiatives which embrace certain specific mechanisms to transnationally (or 
actually supranationally) monitor labour standards and/or activities of MNEs 
are analysed: 1) the European Monitoring Platform; 2) the Optional Legal 
Framework for transnational company agreements; and 3) the European La-
bour Authority.
3.1.1 European monitoring platform
In 1999 the EU adopted a Code of conduct for European enterprises operating 
in developing countries which aim was to create a European enforcement 
mechanism for codes of conduct. In Article 14 of the Resolution that envisaged 
the abovementioned code, the European Parliament ‘call[ed] on the Commis-
sion to study the possibility of setting up a European Monitoring Platform […] 
in close collaboration with the social partners, NGOs from North and South, 
and representatives of indigenous and local communities’.40 To this end, 
39 See for an elaborate overview of the activities of the EU: Beryl ter Haar and Attila Kun, 
‘The EU’s CSR policy in a global and national context’ in Janice Bellace and Beryl ter Haar 
(eds) Research Handbook on Business, Labour and Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar) 
(forthcoming).
40 European Parliament — Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises operating in 
Developing Countries: towards a European Code of Conduct OJ [1999] C104/14 para 14.
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 special rapporteurs were to be appointed and annual hearings were to be held 
in the European Parliament, for which ‘social partners and NGOs from the 
South and the North’ would be invited until the EMP was established.41 The 
EMP — as a genuine institution — has never been realised, but, for example a 
Special Meeting on “Standard Setting by European Enterprises in Developing 
Countries” took place in the European Parliament on 22 November 2000.42 
Two companies were invited to attend this meeting for scrutiny - Adidas did 
not show up.43 The yet to be established EMP would have consisted mostly of 
‘independent experts in addition to a board of representatives from the Euro-
pean business and industry sector and international trade unions, environ-
mental and human rights NGOs, including representatives from the South.’44
Furthermore, the EMP ‘would receive reports from business and industry 
about their compliance with international standards and codes of conduct 
submitted to the Monitoring Platform voluntarily or after request; it would se-
lect case studies on the basis of the information submitted; it would evaluate 
the validity of the complaints and the reports submitted on the basis of agreed 
upon auditing procedures for verification; auditing mechanisms would pro-
vide important factual and experiential background for developing interna-
tional law in relation to corporate conduct; and it would publicise the results 
of the inquiries on an annual basis.’45 The EMP was to be equipped with a 
complaint procedure and some auditing procedures.
3.1.2 Optional legal framework for transnational company 
agreements
Debates on what could help strengthen and enforce transnational company 
agreements (TCAs) go back many years. The idea of an optional legal frame-
work at European level entailing the creation of joint negotiating bodies which 
facilitate the conclusion of transnational collective agreements is among the 
related proposals and was raised for the first time by the European Commis-
sion in one of its work programmes, namely the Social Agenda of 2005.46 
41 Ibid.




44 European Parliament — Explanatory Statement of the Report on EU standards for Europe-
an Enterprises operating in developing countries: towards a European Code of Conduct 
[1998] A4-0508/98, recommendation 2.
45 Ibid.
46 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission on the Social Agenda’ 
(Statement, European Commission, 2005).
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 Although the proposal has not been adopted, the idea is not dead. It is still on 
the agenda of the European Parliament which has issued several resolutions 
on the topic.47 Several reports have been written about the OLF by experts,48 
and the European Trade Union Confederation (‘ETUC’) and affiliates have 
continued to work on it.49
Although monitoring as such is not part of most of these proposals and re-
ports, the 2016 proposal by the ETUC suggests that the OLF should provide 
two particular tools. The first tool is an Alternative Dispute Resolution (‘ADR’) 
mediation mechanism at the European level. This ADR should be accessible to 
signatory parties only and is ‘to be used when the internal procedure set up by 
the TCA itself doesn’t succeed in solving the dispute’.50 Moreover, as part of its 
goals to realise the creation of an OLF, the ETUC has set four actions for itself. 
The fourth action is to ‘continue discussing and lobbying the European Com-
mission [as well as pushing] the Commission to support the [ETUC’s] work on 
the proposals for the mediation and registration mechanisms, as a starting 
point for the development of an OLF’.51
3.1.3 European Labour Authority
The European Labour Authority was announced by President Juncker in his 
2017 State of the European Union speech.52 The aim of the ELA is to ensure 
that EU rules on labour mobility, especially in the context of the posting of 
47 See eg European Parliament — Cross-border collective bargaining and transnational social 
dialogue [2013] 2012/2292 INI.
48 See eg the so-called ‘Ales report’: Edoardo Ales, Samuel Engblom, Teun Jaspers, Sylvaine 
Laulom, Silvana Sciarra, André Sobczak and Fernando Valdés Dal-Ré, ‘Transnational Col-
lective Bargaining. Past, Present and Future’ (Report, European Commission, 2006); Sil-
vana Sciarra, Maximilian Fuchs, André. Sobczak, ‘Towards a Legal Framework for Trans-
national Company Agreements’ (European Trade Union Confederation, 2014).
49 See ETUC Resolution Proposal for an Optional Legal Framework for transnational negotia-
tions in multinational companies, (adopted by the ETUC Executive Committee, 11–12 
March 2014) <https://www.etuc.org/en/document/etuc-resolution-proposal-optional 
-legal-framework-transnational-negotiations-multinational>.
50 ETUC Resolution Roadmap on Transnational Company agreements: Progressing towards 




52 See further, Éva Lukacs, ‘European Labour Authority — The guardian of posting within 
the EU?’ (2018) 1 Hungarian Labour Law E-Journal <www.hllj.hu/20181a.htm>.
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workers, are being enforced in a fair, simple and effective way. The ELA ‘should 
be up and running in 2019 and reach its full operational capacity by 2024’.53
In its impact assessment, the European Commission envisaged three roles 
for the ELA, referred to as “options”.54 Option 1 (support) constitutes a “light-
touch” approach as it focuses on functions of analytical and technical support 
to existing structures and tools. Option 2 (operational role) goes one step fur-
ther by mandating ELA with the functions of promoting common technical 
standards, increasing cooperation between national authorities, coordinating 
and logistically supporting joint cross-border inspections etc.55 The third option 
(“supervisory”; or “mandatory”) depicts “a more thorough EU-level integration 
of certain functions”, going as far as a specialised European Inspection Corps.56
Although the original proposal envisaged a genuine “European inspection 
and enforcement body”,57 the emerging actual set up seems to represent a con-
siderable softer and meagre version.58 The focus of the ELA that is currently 
materializing is on assistance to the national administrations only, which seems 
kind of a combination of Options 1 and 2. Furthermore, Member States will only 
take part in ELA’s activities on a voluntary basis, instead of mandatory as set out 
in Option 3. However, the creation of the ELA will suppose the establishment of 
a permanent structure providing support to national authorities, which itself 
has already a high potential to coordinate inspection at transnational level.59
53 European Commission, European Labour Authority <ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId 
=1414&langId=en>. On 24 May 2019 the Council adopted the Regulation establishing the 
ELA: Council of the European Union, ‘European Labour Authority: Council adopts 
founding regulation’ (Press release, 13 June 2019) <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/
press-releases/2019/06/13/european-labour-authority-council-adopts-founding 
-regulation/>.
54 European Commission, ‘Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European La-
bour Authority’ (Working Document Impact Assessment, 2018) 68.
55 Cf European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Ac-
companying the Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Establishing a European Labour Authority’ (Working Document Impact As-
sessment, 13 March 2018) <eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ET/ALL/?uri=SWD%3A2018
%3A0068%3AFIN>.
56 Ibid.
57 European Commission, ‘President Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address 2017’ 
(Press Release, 13 September 2017) <europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en 
.htm>.
58 See Council of the European Union, Provisional agreement on a Regulation establishing a 
European Labour Authority between the Romanian Presidency of the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, [2019] <www.consilium.europa.eu/>.
59 See for details European Commission, above n 51.
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3.2 Monitoring initiatives at the transnational level
3.2.1 UN Human Rights Council - OEIWG
On 26 June 2014, during its 26th session, the United Nations (‘UN’) Human 
Rights Council adopted Resolution 26/9 by means of which it was decided ‘to 
establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group (‘OEIWG’) on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to hu-
man rights, whose mandate shall be to elaborate an international legally bind-
ing instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.’60 During the delib-
erations of the OEIWG, several NGOs raised the need for an “independent 
monitoring body”.61 In its first session in 2015, some NGOs called for ‘effective 
bodies of enforcement, such as a committee for compliance oversight or a pub-
lic centre for control of transnational corporations.’62 In October 2018, during 
its fourth session, the OEIWG discussed a so called zero draft entitled ´legally 
binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activi-
ties of transnational corporations and other business enterprises´.63 Annexed 
to the zero draft on the Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) is a zero draft Proto-
col which deals with the implementation of the LBI.64 The zero draft on the 
LBI itself does not foresee the establishment of vigorous bodies at the interna-
tional level, such as a court or monitoring mechanism although the Protocol 
does.
The most interesting form of monitoring, in our opinion, is found in Article 5 
of the Protocol, which provides that the “States Parties to the present Protocol 
shall grant to the National Implementation Mechanism [NIM] competence to 
conduct reviews on the implementation of due diligence obligations in accor-
dance with Article 9 of the [LBI]”. To do these reviews, the NIM would have 
several competences, among which “to conduct visits and inspections to the 
60 UN Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, 
26th session A/HRC/RES/26/9 (2014).
61 UN Human Rights Council, Report on the first session of the open-ended intergovernmental 
working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to 
human rights, with the mandate of elaborating an international legally binding instrument, 
31st session A/HRC/31/50 (2016).
62 Ibid.
63 Permanent Mission of Ecuador, Zero Draft Legally Binding Instrument To Regulate, In In-
ternational Human Rights Law, The Activities Of Transnational Corporations And Other 
Business Enterprises (2018).
64 OHCHR, Zero Draft Protocol annexed to the LBI <www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/
HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session4/ZeroDraftOPLegally.PDF>.
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business [enterprise’s] facilities, and conduct joint visits [and inspections] with 
other National Implementation Mechanisms and relevant authorities of the 
concerned State Party to monitor the implementation and follow up of due dili-
gence plans or policies”.65 Once a State Party has accepted the LBI, it automati-
cally accepts the Protocol. Given the fact that the monitoring foreseen in Article 
5 of the Protocol is obligatory (State Parties “shall”), it can be interpreted as un-
derling that any genuine regulation of human rights in transnational setting, 
either public or private, needs to be accompanied with a proper monitoring 
mechanism.
3.2.2 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh
The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh was concluded immedi-
ately after the collapse of the Rana Plaza building on 24 April 2013. Over 220 
companies signed the Accord, which has been renewed by the 2018 Transition 
Accord.66 The Accord is a legally binding agreement between global brands & 
retailers and trade unions (including IndustriALL and UNI global unions). As 
Croucher et al note, “[the] Accord has been able to impose internationally rec-
ognised fire and building standards” and to “establish a relatively well- resourced 
body to undertake inspections including follow-ups”.67 One of its key features 
is the “Independent safety inspections & remediation program”, which repre-
sents a form of transnational labour-related inspection scheme. In short, the 
system works as follows. The signing transnational companies classify their 
suppliers/subcontractors in three groups according to their production’s vol-
ume. The classified suppliers/subcontractors must accept inspections in situ 
and are obliged to solve whatever problems may be detected. This obligation 
has a different intensity depending on the group where the supplier/ 
subcontractor has been classified. Those suppliers with a higher volume of 
production, belonging to “group 1” and “group 2”, are subject to more intense 
inspections. This allows, on the one hand, making the inspections feasible, due 
to the huge number of existing suppliers and, on the other hand, put the pres-
sure on the biggest suppliers, which are those with a stronger bargaining power 
and market share, to open the path in the improvement of health and safety 
conditions of the textile industry in Bangladesh.68
65 Ibid art 5, para 2.
66 The 2018 version of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh can be found at 
the Accord’s website: <bangladeshaccord.org/about>.
67 Richard Croucher, Mark Houssart, Lilan Miles and Philip James, ‘Legal sanction, interna-
tional organisations and the Bangladesh Accord’ [2018] Industrial Law Journal.
68 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, above n 63, art 8–11.
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The inspections are performed by a so-called “qualified Safety Inspector”. 
This Inspector is designated by the Steering Committee. Important for the In-
spector is that, besides being an expert on fire and building safety, he is inde-
pendent of the company, trade union or factory he is inspecting. The Inspector 
selects a team to perform the inspections with. This team of inspectors elabo-
rates reports on the suitability and compliance of the Inspections’ programme 
and informs, when problems are detected, to the signatories of the agreement. 
This information may be published. To secure the enforcement of the Accord, 
the Steering Committee must make publicly available on a regular basis re-
ports on the status of the Inspection programmes and some other information 
related, such as lists with the providers, etc.69
3.2.3 Some forms of monitoring by OECD NCPs
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises constitute “a global 
framework for responsible business conduct covering all areas of business re-
sponsibility, including […] employment and industrial relations”70 Countries 
adhering to the Guidelines are required to set up National Contact Points 
(‘NCPs’). The NCPs have as task to promote the effectiveness of the guidelines, 
therefore their mandate provides, among other competences, to function as a 
platform for mediation and conciliation to resolve cases (known as “specific 
instances”)71 of the alleged infringements of the Guidelines. The good offices of 
the NCPs might involve on-site visits and actual inspection of the situation, 
depending on, among others, the resources of the given NCP.72 Naturally, such 
good offices shall be consensual, resulting in a non-adversarial dialogue.73
NCPs are not per se about monitoring or inspection, but some NCP-cases 
can result in a monitoring plan involving the NCP. Furthermore, “some NCPs 
make it regular practice to follow up on recommendations they provide during 
69 This information is available at the webpage of the Accord <bangladeshaccord.org/>. On 
the achievements of the Accord see also Jeffrey S. Vogt, ‘The Bangladesh Sustainability 
Compact: An Effective Tool for Promoting Worker’s Rights? (2017) 5(4) Politics and Gover-
nance 80, 87–88.
70 OECD, above n 15.
71 See at OECD, Specific instance handling under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational En-
terprises <mneguidelines.oecd.org/specificinstances.htm>.
72 OECD, Guide for National Contact Points on Structures and Activities (2019) <mneguide-
lines.oecd.org/ncps/>.
73 On the origins, development and functioning of the Guidelines see John G. Ruggie and 
Tamaryn Nelson, ‘Human Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 
Normative Innovations and Implementation Challenges’ (2015) 1 Brown Journal of World 
Affairs 99.
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specific instances”.74 Such cases are reported from the UKNCP, the Swiss NCP, 
the French NCP. For instance, the Norwegian NCP notes that ‘parties have ex-
pressed a wish for greater NCP involvement in follow-up, for instance to moni-
tor whether the Guidelines are more effectively implemented by a company 
after the specific instance.’75 Consequently, “[the] Norwegian NCP now advis-
es parties to include more detailed provisions about the implementation of 
the parties’ agreement as part of the follow-up in any mediated statement, in-
cluding the [monitoring] role of the NCP”.76
3.3 Analysis
The selected examples discussed above illustrate that the question of transna-
tional monitoring has been present for some years in a number of projects and 
initiatives. Furthermore, transnational monitoring has been thought of as de-
manding some kind of institutional mechanism to overcome the shortcomings 
and specific problems of labour related issues at transnational level.
In this sense, initiatives like the EMP, the proposal for an OLF for transna-
tional collective bargaining, the Protocol drafted by the working group of UN, 
and the OECD NCPs demand the development of some legal framework and 
institutional apparatus, either brand new or embedded in the institutional set-
ting of international organizations (UN, OECD) or even the supranational legal 
order of the EU (for the EMP, the OLF and the ELA). The rationale behind all 
these initiatives is the will, or need, for some kind of an independent monitor-
ing/auditing/inspection mechanism at transnational level. The will or need 
lies with the aim to overcome shortcomings identified in the existing (or non-
existing) legal framework to govern transnational labour standards and tools. 
Furthermore, these examples show that at EU level and within the UN, OECD, 
etc. The very idea of some kind of a transnational independent and publicly 
rooted monitoring/auditing/inspection mechanism has at least some political 
support.
A number of interesting features in the selected examples we have described 
in this section need to be highlighted here. The examples of the EMP, ELA and 
OECD NCPs are interesting since they have been (or were planned to be) set 
74 OECD, Implementing the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: The National 
Contact Points from 2000 to 2015 (Report, OECD, 2016) 58.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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up within a permanent structure, rather than an ad hoc body to be comprised 
when monitoring is needed. This enables these monitoring bodies to grow and 
improve their functioning, as can be seen by the OECD NCPs, which is the 
most mature body among these initiatives. Another interesting feature of the 
selected examples is that they vary in sort and range of monitoring activities 
they can undertake. However, in combination with the first feature (perma-
nent body) we can see room for these activities to develop from, often, initially 
rather weak monitoring activities, such as operational and technical support, 
the exchange of information, to more structural forms of monitoring such as 
day-to-day cooperation routines, follow-up activities, and to more serious (or 
mature) forms of monitoring like inspections and dispute settlement which 
often takes place in the form of mediation. Even in the example of the Bangla-
desh Accord, which was set up as a temporary monitoring body (initially five 
years) and a specific task (the inspection of fire and building safety) develop-
ment of the monitoring activities can be seen. What these examples have in 
common is a form of stability, which fosters the development of specialization 
and seriousness of the monitoring mechanisms.
Another feature that can be taken from these examples is that none of them 
came to life overnight. All seem to develop in baby steps, nonetheless, develop-
ments into maturity can be witnessed. Especially the development of the 
OECD NCPs monitoring follow up activities by the parties which they medi-
ated a conflict is a striking example. Also the grow-model that seems to 
 underpin the ELA is an interesting illustration. As already hinted at when we 
discussed the idea of Van der Heijden and Zandvliet,77 many of these initia-
tives have a pragmatic and problem-solving approach, rather than a political 
or politicized approach.
All of these examples have a public root in international organizations. The 
EMP, OLF and ELA (were supposed to) have roots within the EU institutional 
settings. The UN Human Rights Council’s discussions envisage embedding of 
monitoring in national public organizations, rather similarly to the OECD 
NCPs. With the Bangladesh Accord we see an embedding of the ILO in the 
initiative envisaging an independent chair of the Steering Committee and at 
national level with the involvement of the Bangladeshi government concern-
ing the development of the fire and building safety inspections. Moreover, the 
example of the Bangladesh Accord — and some other recent notable unique 
initiatives focusing on global supply chains, like the ILO’s Better Work 
77 See section 2, above n 31.
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 Programmes78 and the FIFA’s independent Human Rights Advisory Board79 — 
clearly illustrate that collaborative (public-private mix), multi-stakeholder, 
compliance-enhancing governance mechanisms are a real option within the 
transnational field.80
Our takeaways from these examples for the embedding of the TLI-system 
we envisage within the ILO are the following. Stability is important as it fosters 
the development of specialization and seriousness of the monitoring mecha-
nisms. This cannot be achieved overnight but needs time, as this develops in 
baby steps. Pragmatic hands-on problem-solving monitoring initiatives seem 
to be feasible, contrary to more politicized approaches to monitoring. Having a 
public root through embedding or involvement of in an international organi-
zation seems to be no problem, as long as there is a (political) willingness to 
create public-private structures. Altogether we can conclude that at transna-
tional level there is room for (the further development of) the “third leg of 
government”, ie monitoring.81 Before we turn to an elaboration on how this 
could and should be done by the ILO for the TLI, we take a more theoretical 
turn in order to explore from an international law’s point of view the possibil-
ity to develop this “third leg of government” by directly setting up monitoring 
mechanisms for MNEs.
78 See for information about the ILO’s Better Work Programmes at <betterwork.org/>. Part 
of the activities within the context of these programmes can be “factory assessments”, ie 
an assessment of a factory’s overall progress on meeting international standards and na-
tional laws. The assessment findings are coupled with the factory’s own diagnosis of 
 problems which combined will provide a fair and well-rounded picture of success, dem-
onstrated progress and areas for continued improvement (or persistent problems). Eg the 
Better Work Programme for the ready-made garment and footwear industry in Vietnam. 
See at Better Work, Better Work Vietnam: Our Services <betterwork.org/where-we-work/
vietnam/bwv-our-services/>.
79 The representation of the UN softly ensures the ‘public root’. See Fifa, Fifa Publishes Land-
mark Human Rights Policy (8 June 2017) <www.fifa.com/governance/news/y=2017/m=6/
news=fifa-publishes-landmark-human-rights-policy-2893311.html>.
80 See on this public-private mix Manfred Weiss ‘International Labour Standards: A Com-
plex Public-Private Policy Mix’ (2013) 29(1) The International Journal of Comparative La-
bour Law and Industrial Relations 7; Ulrich Mückenberger, ‘Hybrid Global Labour Law’, in 
Roger Blanpain and Franck Hendrickx (eds), Labour Law Between Change and Tradition, 
Liber Amicorum Antoine Jacobs, (Kluwer, 2011) 99.
81 This refers to the idea that enforcement of labour law in general depends basically on 
state (public) action of detecting employers that breach the law, and such state actions 
basically have three ‘legs’: inspection, dispute-settlement (access to justice) and ‘public 
campaigns to provide workers with information about their rights’. See eg Ravi Kanbur 
and Lucas Ronconi, ‘Enforcement Matters: The Effective Regulation of Labor’ (2018) 
157(3) International Labour Review 331, 333.
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4 ILP for MNEs and “Subject Normation” by International 
Organizations
The aim of this paper is to indicate how the ILO could (and should) embed a 
TLI-system. Even though the role of the ILO is limited to facilitation and sup-
port and the TLI-system is something MNEs can opt voluntarily, from an inter-
national law perspective a TLI system raises the question of the extent of ILO 
competence. More generally, in the context of (international) human and la-
bour rights law, the measures adopted by international organizations address-
ing MNEs directly are legally non-binding. The presumed reason for this is that 
international organizations lack legal competence to adopt legally binding 
measures,82 because MNEs are not subjects of international law.83 However, 
this is based on a rather outdated approach of international legal personality 
(‘ILP’) in which only states are considered subjects of international law. Since 
the 1960s, the view on ILP has changed significantly and consequently, it is no 
longer self-evident that MNEs lack ILP. In this section we elaborate on the 
extent to which MNEs are considered to have ILP and what this means for 
international organizations to adopt measures directly addressing MNEs. We 
will conclude with a reflection on what this means for the ILO to embed a TLI-
system as we propose.
4.1 Inclusive approach on ILP
When we review the literature on ILP we have to come to the conclusion that, 
similar to soft law,84 there are as many interpretations as there are scholars 
with theories and thoughts about this.85 Many of these scholars refer or build 
on the ideas of Friedmann. What is interesting about Friedmann’s idea is that 
it keeps a close link between the role of international organizations and the 
82 Cf Yarik Kryvoi, ‘Enforcing Labor Rights against Multinational Corporate Groups in Eu-
rope’ (2007) 46 Industrial Relations 2.
83 See in general Robin F. Hansen ‘The International Legal Personality of Multinational En-
terprises: Treaty, Custom and the Governance Gap’ (2010) 10(1) Global Jurist.
84 M.A. García-Muñoz Alhambra, above n 6.
85 See eg Hansen, above n 79; Janne E. Nijman, The Concept of International Legal Personali-
ty. An inquiry into the history and theory of international law (TMC Asser Press, 2018) 405, 
455, with reference to A. Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of 
International Law (1991) 66(2) European Journal of International Law 1, in which Carty 
discusses Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The structure of International Le-
gal Argument (Cambridge University Press, 1989); Anne Peters, Beyond Human Rights. The 
legal status of the individual in international law (Cambridge University Press, 2016); and 
William T. Worster, ‘Relative International Legal Personality of Non-State Actors’ (2016) 42 
Brook Journal of International Law 207.
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possibility to govern a “person” because it has (limited) ILP, which is exactly 
the connection we need for our proposal to embed the TLI within the ILO.
Friedmann’s account of ILP actually starts with Leibniz’ interpretation of 
ILP which was set in the Westphalian times, namely ILP was ‘the prerogative 
of those whose “authority, then, is sufficiently extensive,” to be called sover-
eign.86 For Leibnitz this was a person, not a State.87 A ruler was a person who 
could “count on sufficient freedom and power to exercise some influence in 
international affairs”, eg “with armies or by treaties”.88 Such a person had ILP.89 
Having ILP meant that a ruler had powers or rights, as well as “the legal re-
sponsibility to use their authority” in accordance with international law.90 ILP 
conceptualized by Leibniz therefore held two concepts: a technical concept to 
indicate formal subjection to the law of nations and a substantial or material 
concept which added to the capacity to act responsibly and justly.91 As such, 
Leibniz’ conceptualization is interesting with respect to MNEs, since, at least 
based on the Ruggie framework and the OECD’s interpretation of due dili-
gence, MNEs are expected to act responsibly and justly for as far as this is with-
in the range of their capacity.92
In a way, Friedmann brings Leibniz’ interpretation of ILP into the 20th cen-
tury when he, building on the works of, among others, Morgenthau, Lauter-
pacht and McDougal, reappraises ILP, in a pragmatical and functional manner. 
More particularly, Friedmann argued that ILP should be an “inclusive” concept 
requiring a re-ordering of the subjects of international law by embracing, next 
to States as principal subjects of international law, also international organiza-
tions and to a lesser extent private corporations and human individuals.93 In 
Nijman’s view Friedmann’s approach to ILP, especially the consideration of 
the relationship between responsibility and justice, reflects a post-modern 
take on ILP.94 While over the course of time individuals and international 
86 Nijman, above n 81, 77, with reference to Gottfried .W. Leibniz, Codex Juris Gentium diplo-
maticus, in the transl. of Patrick Riley (ed), Leibniz Political Writing (Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) 175.





92 As indicated above in section 2.
93 Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 1964) ch 1, 6, 365–8.
94 Ibid 307.
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 organizations have been recognized as subjects of international law,95 MNEs 
only hold “limited ad hoc subjectivity” to the extent that their transactions 
could be controlled by the norms of public law.96
In the context of human rights law, arguments have been made that given 
its purpose to guarantee certain ‘inalienable levels of treatment and entitle-
ment for all people, efficacy logically demands that the principles extend be-
yond obligations on States alone.’97 De Jonge takes this one step further and 
argued that MNEs should be subjected “to mandatory standards of interna-
tional law comparable to those which states are subject to”.98 She substantiates 
her arguments by elaborating on how MNEs could be brought under interna-
tional law in similar ways as States are.99 To a certain extent this is already the 
situation, for example regarding norms of jus cogens,100 such as not to commit 
slavery. In her conclusions though, De Jonge recognizes that for the time being 
such would not be feasible. Inclusion of MNEs on equal footing as States im-
plies that they also will be equally involved in the (international) standard set-
ting processes. Smaller (and often poorer) States, but also NGOs (and for la-
bour rights, trade unions) are very wary of the influence of MNEs. MNEs, in 
turn, apparently are not very keen on such an involvement either, seemingly 
out of fear and suspicion of being subjected to more regulations.101
Based on the above review we can conclude that there is a status quo that 
MNEs have limited ILP. More particularly, in the context of this paper – the 
monitoring of MNEs CSR policies – it is clear that MNEs have internationally 
recognized and promoted responsibilities.102 Since it is recognized that MNEs 
have responsibilities, arguments are made that international organizations 
could and should set standards and stipulate what kind of behaviour is ex-
pected from MNEs.103 Materially, De Jonge makes the most persuasive 
95 Ibid 341. See also Alice de Jonge, Transnational Corporations and International Law. Ac-
countability in the Global Business Environment (Edward Elgar 2011) 147–148.
96 Nijman, above n 81, 342.
97 Adam McBeth, International Economic Actors and Human Rights (Routledge, 2010), 249. 
See for similar accounts: Nijman, above n 81; and Peters, above n 81.
98 De Jonge, above n 92, 149.
99 Eg on how the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could be expanded to 
MNEs and how MNE Responsibility could be modeled on State Responsibility. Ibid 
150–158.
100 Cf ibid 150.
101 Ibid 209.
102 Cf Hansen, above n 79, 79; De Jonge, above n 92, 149; McBeth, above n 94, 249.
103 Cf De Jonge, above n 92, 149–150; Jose E Alvarez, ‘Are Corporations Subjects of Interna-
tional Law’ (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law. 1, 31; and Adefolake Adeyeye, 
‘The Role of Global Governance in CSR’ (2011) 9 Santa Clara Journal of International Law. 
147 (esp 165–6 where she refers to this as ‘global governance’).
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 arguments for this: subjecting MNEs to (mandatory) “standards of interna-
tional law would be to the benefit of both the global community and the indi-
vidual TNC”.104 MNEs would benefit as this would provide them with a legal 
back up against the pressure of often short term benefit oriented to sharehold-
er demands in order to strive for long-term shareholder value, market stability 
and business sustainability.105 The global community would benefit from as 
this would support governments in host states ‘to legislate at the local level in 
conformity with those [international] standards, without risk of being accused 
of breaching obligations imposed by trade and investment treaties.106 We 
would like to add to this argument that this would also level the global market 
playing field to a certain extent, since the same standards would apply no mat-
ter where the business takes place. This is to the benefit of the MNE as it is 
clear what is expected wherever business is done and would benefit the host 
state by limiting the MNE to negotiate about these standards under the threat 
of taking the business elsewhere.
Turning back to the issue of the possibility for international organizations, 
and the ILO in particular, to set norms for MNEs we can conclude that there 
are formal as well as material arguments legitimizing this. To distinguish this 
kind of standard setting international organizations from what they do for 
States that possess full ILP, we would like to call this ‘subject normation’. The 
term ‘subject’ refers to the fact that the standard applies to entities that have 
been recognized as subjects for that particular standard. The term ‘normation’ 
refers to the aim of the standard to set a norm of expected behaviour by the 
recognized subjects. Although this may not create the strong duties interna-
tional law can put on states, as underlined by Hansen107 and De Jonge,108 there 
is potential to legitimize the activities of international organizations to create 
the three legged-structure governments use to enforce compliance with labour 
law,109 and hence more room for a better embedding of a TLI system.
5 Embedding The TLI within The ILO
In this section we aim to explain how our proposal for a TLI system could, and 
should, be embedded within the ILO. To do so, we depart from the ILO’s 
104 De Jonge, above n 92, 149.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Hansen, above n 79, 79.
108 De Jonge, above n 92, 149.
109 See above section 3 and n 77.
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 already existing tools and functions related to MNEs specifically. With this we 
will illustrate that many elements of our proposal — if not its overall idea — 
are already (at least potentially) present to some extent within the ILO. In a 
second step, we describe how our proposal for a TLI system fits within the 
ILO’s supervisory and monitoring activities.
The main initiative of the ILO aimed at MNEs directly is the Tripartite Dec-
laration for MNEs, which is complemented by a Helpdesk for Business on In-
ternational Labour Standards (further: the Helpdesk).110 The Helpdesk is run 
by MULTI (Multinational Enterprises and Enterprise Engagement Unit), 
whose key actions include running the Helpdesk; capacity building and train-
ing; “research and country-level assistance on topic areas of the MNE Declara-
tion”; and “[p]romotion of the MNE Declaration among governments, employ-
ers and workers and the business community through collaboration with 
international organizations”.111 The Helpdesk is described as a “one-stop shop 
for company managers and workers on how to better align business operations 
with international labour standards and build good industrial relations”.112 Ad-
ditionally, the Helpdesk can offer a neutral place to MNEs and trade unions 
when they want to discuss issues of mutual concern, as well as provide input 
for the dialogue as a technical or expert adviser, and facilitate the dialogue it-
self.113 If necessary or so desired, the Helpdesk can “identify and maintain a list 
of qualified facilitators, and provide support to ensure that they execute their 
functions effectively”.114
Interesting elements to highlight with respect to our proposal are 
MULTI’s task for capacity building and training and the Helpdesk’s op-
tion to “identify and maintain a list of qualified facilitators”. For us, these 
are indications that how we envisage a TLI system embedded within the 
ILO is not so very far and different from what the ILO is actually already 
doing; especially since our TLI proposal would require the ILO to com-
pile and maintain a list of labour inspectors that are either trained by the 
ILO itself or by an organization recognised or accredited by the ILO. 





113 In public international law these activities qualify as ‘offering good offices’, which is con-
sidered as a form of diplomatic dispute settlement. Malcom N Shaw, International Law 
(Cambridge University Press 2003) 767, 770.
114 Annex II to the MNE Declaration (2011) s2.
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These are two elements that are clearly not alien to the activities already 
employed by the ILO.115 Moreover, these activities have been embraced 
by the ILO itself according to its own statement made during the second 
session of the OEIWG: capacity building and awareness-raising in public 
and private sectors are provided by the ILO to implement ILS and com-
bat abuses in transnational operations. Special attention is given to gov-
ernment capacity to ensure inspection and enforcement, remedy and 
redress, by bolstering not only inspectorate knowledge and capacity, but 
also that of the law-makers and those who exercise justice through activi-
ties with parliamentarians and the judiciary.116
Hence, the training and accreditation of ‘transnational’ labour inspectors as 
well as facilitating a list of TLIs would be just one small step beyond the cur-
rent activities of the ILO in relation to the training of national labour 
inspectors.
What is rather uncharted territory is the idea of establishing a system (ie the 
TLI) that fulfils a function (ie inspection), which traditionally has remained 
national. As we indicated in section 2 where we reviewed our proposal, the 
monitoring by the TLI will be complementary to national inspectorates. More 
particularly, the TLI activities will be limited to the commitments MNEs ad-
here to in their TPLI, eg CSR code of conduct. That there is also a need for such 
complementary publicly rooted monitoring at transnational level is clear from 
the, sometimes experimental and embryonic, examples we described in sec-
tion 3. That it should be the ILO to facilitate such a TLI function seems simply 
logical given the fact that the ILO is already involved with a few of them, espe-
cially in the role of ‘guarantor of neutrality’, eg the Bangladesh Accord and the 
ILO’s own Better Work Programmes. Moreover, embedding the TLI system 
would enable the ILO to align its inspection involvements and as such make 
this part of its activities more visible. Also, combining the experience of the 
various inspection activities would foster the harmonization and professional-
ization of these activities. As such the TLI would not only extent the ILO´s 
toolkit with an additional tool to ensure compliance with labour standards, it 
115 See for an example of a training programme related to CSR and due diligence: ILO, Inter-
national Labour Standards and Corporate Responsibility: Understanding Workers’ Rights in 
the Framework of Due Diligence (October 2018) <https://www.ilo.org/empent/Eventsandn-
meetings/WCMS_624284/lang--en/index.htm>.
116 ILO submission for the 2nd session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working 
Group on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to hu-
man rights(OHCHR, 2016) 10.
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would also offer the ILO a forum to professionalize its own inspection 
activities.
The TLI not only fits well within the ILO’s activities regarding MNEs specifi-
cally, it also fits well within the ILO’s more general supervisory and monitoring 
activities. We would not go as far as to propose that the TLI system would be-
come part of the ILO’s hard core supervisory mechanism, such as the regular 
system of supervision, and the special procedures. Similar to Van der Heijden 
and Zandvliet,117 we would instead argue that it could become an additional 
or complementary instrument to these mechanisms. More particularly, the 
TLI could be considered as an extra instrument in the ILO’s broader toolkit 
to foster compliance with the labour standards, which besides the superviso-
ry mechanisms also includes General Surveys, and Technical Assistance and 
Training. Via the General Surveys the ILO “examine[s] the impact of Conven-
tions and Recommendations”; “analyse[s] the difficulties indicated by govern-
ments as impeding their application”; and “identifie[s] means of overcoming 
these obstacles”.118 Technical Assistance and Training includes various activi-
ties via which ILO officials (or other experts) offer countries help to imple-
ment and comply with the obligations under ratified Conventions. More par-
ticularly, Technical Assistance includes activities such as advice, direct contact 
missions, and promotional activities like seminars and workshops.119 Training 
is provided by the ILO’s International Training Centre (ITC) in Turin. The 
trainings are offered for, among others, government officials (including labour 
inspectors)120 and employers.121 More generally, as part of technical assistance 
the ILO employs officials, but also can supply “other experts”, and the training 
provided by the ITC in Turin includes trainings for labour inspections as well 
as MNEs interested in CSR and due diligence. Thus, again we can conclude that 
the activities of the ILO required to facilitate a publicly rooted TLI system is 
not completely alien to what is already custom to the ILO. Also in this wider 
toolkit of the ILO, we can see that the TLI would complete the three-legged 
model to ensure compliance with labour rights. The ILO’s supervisory activi-
ties could be considered as a form of ADR (first leg). The technical assistance 
and training activities could be regarded as the second leg of enforcement, 
117 See section 2 and n 31.




120 See <https://www.itcilo.org/> for an impression of courses for inspectors.
121 Ibid for examples of trainings for MNEs on CSR.
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namely  awareness raising about rights and obligations. The TLI would form the 
third leg: inspection.
When we review the embedding of the TLI within the ILO from an interna-
tional law point of view we can conclude the following. As we explored in sec-
tion 4, there exists the status quo that MNEs have limited ILP, in particular 
when it comes to their responsibility in CSR matters, which creates legitimacy 
for international organizations to set standards (subject normation). Turning 
to the TLI system and the ILO, this means that there are no obstacles for the 
ILO to more consciously and strategically develop its inspection activities. The 
ILO is already active when it comes to the training of inspectors, both with 
national legislation as well as regarding the monitoring of CSR policies. Fur-
thermore, the ILO is already involved with transnational inspection activities 
to ensure neutrality and credible monitoring with the Bangladesh Accord and 
its’ own Better Work Programmes. As argued before, the TLI would not only be 
an additional instrument in the ILO’s toolkit to ensure compliance with labour 
standards, it could also be a forum to further develop and professionalize its 
own (transnational) inspection activities, which we took as one of the impor-
tant elements from the examples we discussed in section 3.122
To conclude, there are no general technical-legal obstacles for the ILO to 
embed a TLI system since it is generally accepted that MNEs possess ILP in 
relation to their responsibility in CSR matters. Not only does the ILP of MNEs 
in these matters legitimises subject normation activities by the ILO, as pre-
sented in section 4, there are also persuasive material arguments for the ILO to 
do so. Furthermore, given the already existing activities of the ILO, the activi-
ties required to embed and facilitate the TLI system as we envisage it, espe-
cially to comprise and maintain a list of accredited TLIs and to train potential 
TLIs, are not alien at all to the ILO. More institutionally there are two settings 
within the ILO in which the TLI could fit perfectly: within the Helpdesk which 
is run by MULTI, or as additional instrument to the ILO’s supervisory mecha-
nism and its Technical Assistance and Training activities that are part of the 
ILO’s general toolkit to enforce compliance with the labour standards. In both 
institutional settings the TLI would complement the ILO’s existing activities 
with the ‘third leg’ to ensure compliance: awareness raising; (alternative) dis-
pute settlement; and inspection. Additionally, embedding the TLI would en-
able the ILO to further develop and professionalize its own inspection activi-
ties. Setting aside the political feasibility of the embedding of the TLI within 
the ILO, the proliferation of various publicly rooted forms of transnational 
122 See especially the example of the NCPs and considerations about the ELA.
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monitoring we described in section 3, the fact that there are no technical-legal 
obstacles to set up a TLI as explored in section 4, and in light of the already 
existing activities of the ILO explored in this section, it seems just a matter of 
seizing the right moment to make it happen.
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